Negative impact of laws regarding biosecurity and bioterrorism on real diseases  by Wurtz, N. et al.
Negative impact of laws regarding biosecurity and bioterrorism on real
diseases
N. Wurtz1, M. P. Grobusch2 and D. Raoult1
1) URMITE, CNRS UMR 7278, IRD 198, Inserm 1095, Aix Marseille Universite, Marseille, France and 2) Centre of Tropical Medicine and Travel Medicine,
Department of Infectious Diseases, Academic Medical Centre, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Abstract
Research on highly pathogenic microorganisms in biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories is very important for human public health, as it
provides opportunities for the development of vaccines and novel therapeutics as well as diagnostic methods to prevent epidemics.
However, in recent years, after the anthrax and World Trade Center attacks in 2001 in the USA, the threat of bioterrorism has grown for
both the public and the authorities. As a result, technical and physical containment measures and biosafety and biosecurity practices have
been implemented in laboratories handling these dangerous pathogens. Working with selected biological agents and toxins is now highly
regulated, owing to their potential to pose a threat to public health and safety, despite the fact that the anthrax attack was found to be the
result of a lack of security at a US Army laboratory. Thus, these added regulations have been associated with a large amount of fruitless
investment. Herein, we describe the limitations of research in these facilities, and the multiple consequences of the increased regulations.
These limitations have seriously negatively impacted on the number of collaborations, the size of research projects, and, more generally,
scientiﬁc research on microbial pathogens. Clearly, the actual number of known victims and fatalities caused by the intentional use of
microorganisms has been negligible as compared with those caused by naturally acquired human infections.
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Introduction
Research on highly pathogenic microorganisms in biosafety
level 3 and 4 laboratories is critical for human public health,
as it provides opportunities for the development of vaccines
and novel therapeutics as well as improved diagnostic
methods to prevent epidemics and optimize care for
individual patients. However, working with these pathogens
requires precautions that guarantee the safety of humans
and the environment, as they may be disseminated because
of a laboratory accident, poor laboratory practices, or
intentional removal and subsequent release (bioterrorism
attack).
According to the CDC, a bioterrorism attack constitutes the
deliberate release of viruses or bacteria used to cause illness or
death in people, animals, or plants. The ﬁrst documented use of
microorganisms as a bioweapon occurred in 1346 at Caffa (now
Feodasia in Ukraine) by the Mongols, who catapulted the
bodies of plague victims over the city walls to infect the
surrounding population and encourage disease spread [1,2].
Since then, many microorganisms have been proposed as
bioterrorism agents, and several attempts have been noted. In
1972, the Geneva Convention related to the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons, and their destruction, was
ratiﬁed (http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume
%201015/volume-1015-I-14860-English.pdf). However, many
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signatory countries (including the Soviet Union and Iraq)
continued research on and production of biological agents. For
example, in 1979, it was found that the Russians had continued
their studies on Bacillus anthracis, as revealed by an anthrax
epidemic that resulted in 64 deaths in the city of Sverdlovsk
(now Ekaterinburg). This incident occurred on a military facility,
and resulted from an accidental release of anthrax spores [3].
Finally, a series of anthrax attacks occurred in the USA in 2001
[4,5], in which letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to
several news media ofﬁces and two Democratic party senators,
killing ﬁve people and infecting 17 others. Some observers were
ﬁrst tempted to link the attacks to al-Qaeda, although, on the
basis of genomic analyses, investigators turned to an American
microbiologist named Bruce Edwards Ivins. Dr Ivins was a
principal investigator of a military laboratory at Fort Detrick
(Maryland) that specialized in biological weapons; in particular,
this laboratory contributed to the development of anthrax
vaccines. Ivins had a history of mental health problems and was
facing a difﬁcult time professionally in 2001, because an anthrax
vaccine that he was working on was failing [6]. It is of note that
both of these accidents (in Russia and the USA) occurred at
military institutes studying military biological weapons and/or
microorganisms involved in bioterrorism. Subsequently, all
countries working on these ‘difﬁcult’ bacteria were penalized
because of the mismanagement in these facilities. In particular, it
has become increasingly difﬁcult to work on plague and
tularaemia, diseases that kill people naturally, unlike the
‘bioterrorism attacks’, which were actually caused by poor
military management. Moreover, in recent years, the public has
become increasingly concerned with the threat of bioterror-
ism. Indeed, the bioterrorism threat has been largely exagger-
ated by the media, fuelling unsubstantiated fear that is out of
proportion to the actual threat. To illustrate this fact, according
to the Information Web of Knowledge database, there are
6852 publications with the keyword ‘bioterrorism’ and 73 609
citations from 1995 to the present. During the same period,
ﬁve people died following a false ‘bioterrorism attack’, which
corresponds to a ratio of 1370 publications per death! For
example, in France, no single case of bioterrorism has ever
been identiﬁed. As previously described for some viral
respiratory infections [7], the numbers of publications gener-
ated is disproportionate to the public health problem. By
contrast, for example, tuberculosis kills c. 1.4 million people
worldwide each year [8], and the emerging epidemic Beijing
clone, which caused at least 13% of the tuberculosis deaths
(180 000), led to 856 publications, giving a total of 1596
citations through 2013 [7] and a ratio of 0.0047 publications per
death!
It goes without saying that the scientiﬁc community must
alert the public of emerging infections and the risks associated
with infectious agents. However, the reactions must remain
proportional to the number of cases and deaths, as this has a
signiﬁcant impact on governments and international agencies
and the strategic decisions implemented.
Both the anthrax attacks and the World Trade Center
attack in September 2001 have led to signiﬁcant increases in
US government funding for biological warfare research and
preparedness.
More than 180 pathogens have been reported as potential
agents for bioterrorism (Table 1). The CDC has classiﬁed
these agents into three different categories according to their
infectiousness, virulence, public perception, impact, and cost
and sophistication of countermeasures [9]. Category A
includes the most dangerous microorganisms that can be
easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person,
facultatively resulting in high mortality, with potential impacts
in terms of public health. These pathogens may cause public
panic and social disruption, and require speciﬁc actions for
public health preparedness. Category B includes agents that
are moderately easy to disseminate, cause moderate morbidity
and low mortality, and require enhancement of diagnostic
capacities and speciﬁc surveillance. Category C includes
emerging infectious agents that could be engineered for mass
dissemination in the future because of their availability and
ease of production and dissemination, as well as their potential
to cause high rates of morbidity and mortality and to have a
major health impact. After 2001, a broader system of controls
related to the possession, use and transfer of select agents was
established, including imprisonment and ﬁnes. Biological select
agents and toxins (BSATs) are deﬁned by the US Department
of Health and Human Services and the US Department of
Agriculture in accordance with the CDC. These BSATs are
considered to be pathogens or biological toxins that have the
potential to pose a severe threat to public, animal or plant
health, and are divided into three categories: (i) US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services select agents and toxins
affecting humans; (ii) US Department of Agriculture select
agents and toxins affecting agriculture; and (iii) overlap select
agents and toxins affecting both (http://www.selectagents.gov/
resources/List_of_Select_Agents_and_Toxins_2013-09-10.pdf).
The real fear of bioterrorism started after 2001, when
hijacked aircraft were used as missiles, and the anthrax attacks
followed in the wake of these events. These bioterrorism
events, unlike others before them and irrespective of their
actual very limited size, had a global impact and changed the
perception of the public. Moreover, bioterrorism has been
sensationalized by the media, and the perceived threat is now
far greater than the real threat. Because we have not yet
suffered a mass biological warfare event, the proposed
bioterrorism scenarios can be challenged and, indeed, seem
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very unlikely. If such an event were to occur, the social impact
could be catastrophic, as was the case in 2001 after the
anthrax attacks in the USA; in France, for example, >4500
suspicious parcels were identiﬁed, but no toxic product was
found [10].
In recent decades, authorities and researchers have devel-
oped regulations and guidelines that describe containment
measures and working instructions, especially for select agents
and toxins that are biological agents or biological toxins that
have the potential to be used in acts of bioterrorism and pose
a severe threat either to public health and safety or to
agricultural plants and animals. Multiple, complementary and
sometimes overlapping biosafety and biocontainment require-
ments exist worldwide, and sometimes these regulations are
open to interpretation, and are consequently and logically
subject to misinterpretation. All of these measures, in
accordance with the increased importance of biosafety and
biosecurity, as discussed above, have severe consequences for
laboratories and even greater consequences for reference
laboratories. In the great majority of cases, this especially
concerns biosafety level 3 laboratories, as the number of
level 4 laboratories in the world is relatively small.
Literature Review
Putative intentional use of pathogens involved in
bioterrorism vs. natural hazards
In recent years, emerging and re-emerging infections, as well as
the risk of bioterrorist events, have attracted increasing
attention from health authorities, because of the epidemic
potential that makes some of them a real public health
challenge [11,12]. It is also interesting to draw a comparison
between natural cases of infection and the intentional use of
microorganisms in bioterrorism. First, c. 15 million (>25%) of
the 57 million annual deaths worldwide are estimated to be
related directly to infectious diseases [13]. These data exclude
the additional millions of deaths that occur as a consequence of
infections or complications. Incidents involving biological
weapons during the latter half of the 20th century were
scarce. Moreover, it is challenging to describe the epidemiol-
ogy of agents of bioterrorism, because some research has been
conducted by military or state organizations, with only a small
percentage of their activities being publically reported; hence,
it can be difﬁcult to distinguish between natural and intentional
events. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonprolifera-
tion Project at the Monterey Institute Center compiled a list of
the chemical, biological and nuclear attacks worldwide [14].
This analysis noted that, between 1960 and 1999, only eight
criminal attacks with biological agents led to casualties,
inﬂicting a total of 29 deaths and 31 injuries. As shown in
Table 2, on comparison of the number of natural infections
caused by dangerous bacteria (http://www.cdc.gov/plague/
maps/index.html; http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/faq/small
pox_disease.asp; http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/
Publications/annual-epidemiological-report-2013.pdf; http://www.
who.int/csr/resources/publications/plague/whocdscsredc992a.
pdf; [15–19]; http://www.cdc.gov/rmsf/stats/) with infections
caused by bioweapons [20], it is clear that the natural threat is
much greater than the intentional threat. Indeed, casualties
resulting from intentional attacks are insigniﬁcant as compared
with the burden of morbidity and mortality associated with
natural infectious diseases. In conclusion, it is essential to focus
research and investigations on the natural emergence of deadly
and contagious infectious disease rather than on putative
bioterrorism attacks.
TABLE 1. List of potential bioterrorism agents
Category Bacteria Viruses Toxins Parasites
A Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)
Yersinia pestis (plague)
Francisella tularensis (tularaemia)
Brucella species (brucellosis)
Food safety threats (e.g. Salmonella species,
Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shigella,
Staphylococcus aureus)
Variola virus (smallpox)
Haemorrhagic fever viruses
(Ebola, Marburg, Lassa and
Machupo viruses)
Clostridium botulinum toxin –
B Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci)
Q-fever (Coxiella burnetti)
Typhus (Rickettsia prowazekii)
Cholera (Vibrio cholerae)
Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses,
e.g. Venezuelan, eastern or western
equine encephalitis)
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
Ricin toxin of Ricinus communis
Abrin toxin of Abrus precatorius
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
Cryptosporidium parvum
C Multidrug-resistant Mycobacterium
tuberculosis
Nipah virus
Hantavirus
SARS
H1N1
HIV/AIDS
Encephalomyelitis viruses (TBE, others)
– –
HIV, human immunodeﬁciency virus; TBE, Tick Borne Encephalitis.
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Costs of bioterrorism
Research on infectious agents, particularly BSATs, is vital for
public health and national security. However, the long list of
regulations and standards has an impact not only on the
researchers but also on the administrative and support
infrastructure of institutions engaging in research with infec-
tious agents [21]. Scientists who choose to pursue the
investigation of such pathogens will probably be confronted
with a long and tortuous process.
Between 2001 and 2012, the federal government of the
USA spent $60 billion on biodefence efforts, according to
analyses from the Center for Biosecurity of the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center in Baltimore, Maryland [22]. This
money helped to modernize the public health system of the
USA, and the BioShield project has prepared a stock of
20 million doses of the smallpox vaccine, 28.75 million doses
of the anthrax vaccine, and 1.98 million doses of four drugs
used to treat the complications of smallpox, anthrax, and
botulism. However, as described by Hayden [22], much of
the biodefence money did not go into research. For example,
the CDC received most of the money ($17.4 billion), and
put the vast majority into public health infrastructure. In all,
only $11.99 billion of the $60 billion was spent on pro-
grammes concerned with biodefence research (c. $1 billion
per year).
However, the increase in laws concerning BSATs and BSAT
laboratories has had signiﬁcant consequences, as the costs of
ongoing security and safety largely exceed the funds received
by institutions to cover the costs of facilities, maintenance, and
operations. Thus, in the absence of continued funding, these
institutions must be willing and able to commit funds to meet
the additional ﬁnancial burden. Dias et al. [23] conducted a
bibliographic analysis of the B. anthracis and Ebola virus
literature between 1992 and 2007 in the USA, to determine
whether negative consequences of laws on BSATs could be
detected. These authors noted that, after 2002, the number of
publications concerning these two pathogens increased; how-
ever, the most striking effect observed was not associated with
individual authors or institutions, and was instead associated
with a loss of efﬁciency (increase of two-fold to ﬁve-fold in the
cost of BSAT research).
In biosafety level 3 and 4 laboratories, limitations on
research with regard to biosecurity regulations, safety consid-
erations, research space limitations and physical constraints in
experimental procedures are real. Furthermore, there will be
several consequences of the reinforcement of regulations: (i)
an increase in paperwork when transferring strains across the
world, and strengthening of procedures for tracing strains; (ii)
an increase in quality procedures for laboratories, particularly
operations to maintain containment, worker protection, andT
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the protection of biological samples in the laboratories (e.g.
people and sample movements, and waste and inactivation–
sterilization protocols); (iii) modiﬁcations of biosafety level
laboratories that are not yet compliant with the new
regulations; and (iv) an increase in personnel training processes
(longer and more complex training) [24,25]. All of these
measures will have serious impacts on the budgets of
laboratories, and will lead to a considerable loss of time, as
well as inefﬁciency, in research and scientiﬁc publication.
More speciﬁc consequences associated with laboratory
research areas have been noted since the establishment of new
regulations (Table 3). The following section cites two
examples.
This ﬁrst example concerns our laboratory, ‘URMITE’.
‘Mediterranee Infection’ is a university hospital institute that
encompasses infectious diseases and tropical medicine at the
University Hospital of Marseille, as well as diagnostic micro-
biology and parasitology, and serves as a national referral
centre for the diagnosis of rickettsial diseases, and infections
with Coxiella and Bartonella species, and Francisella tularensis
(http://www.mediterranee-infection.com). Two main research
units, URMITE and UMR190, currently produce >350 interna-
tional scientiﬁc publications per year, and include 450 person-
nel (with 80 national and international students and PhD
researchers). This laboratory coordinates European and
international networks, serves as a leader in the research on
several infectious diseases, including endocarditis, Whipple
disease, rickettsial diseases, Q-fever, and arboviral disease, and
is directly involved in defence against bioterrorism and highly
contagious diseases.
Our laboratory is closely involved with the implementation
of novel French regulations, particularly concerning BSATs. As
a national reference centre for tularaemia and rickettsial
diseases, which are considered to be caused by BSATs in
France, our laboratory must follow and implement the
regulations and speciﬁcations concerning biosafety level 3
laboratory structures. Since the implementation of the new
law in 2013 in France [26], the research programmes
concerning BSATs in our laboratory have been put on standby,
while we await the decisions of the French national security
agency. Moreover, there has been an increase in restrictive
procedures (in handling, training, etc.) that have and will
continue to have negative consequences for our laboratory in
terms of efﬁciency, productivity, and development, as
described above.
The second example concerns smallpox research.
Smallpox is believed to have emerged in the Middle East
c. 6000–10 000 years ago, and this infection caused 500 mil-
lion deaths in the 20th century alone [27,28]. Smallpox was
largely erased as a result of the Jenner vaccine, and the last
case of illness caused by this virus occurred in Somalia in 1977
[29]; the World Health Assembly (WHA) declared that
smallpox had been ofﬁcially eradicated in 1980. The last
known stocks of variola virus are held by the USA at the CDC
(consisting of 450 isolates) and in Russia at the State Research
Centre of Virology and Biotechnology (approximately 150
samples, consisting of 120 strains) [30,31]. At the 60th Annual
WHA in 2007, the WHO called for the destruction of known
remaining stocks of the virus, to eliminate the risk of accidental
release or theft, after multiple previous attempts. The ﬁnal
TABLE 3. Examples of new requirements to be implemented in laboratories working on biological select agents and toxins
(BSATs) in France following the publication of the decree of 26 June 2013 [26]
Types of requirement Speciﬁcations and consequences
Personnel training Each laboratory should establish an individualized training plan tailored to each activity. In fact, these training
requirements, which also enable people to work on BSATs, exclude short-term trainees from participating in
work on all or some BSATs. This could result in a heavy burden for some laboratories
Laboratories, equipment, and materials The design and use of laboratories and equipment are based on the process of risk management, which involves
many requirements in terms of resources; it is important to budget accurately before initiating work on BSATs.
In addition, the validation, qualiﬁcation, maintenance and monitoring of security and safety equipment will be a
very important part of the operating expenses of the laboratory. The ‘old’ laboratories should expect
compliance to result in signiﬁcant expenditure
Management of subcontractor The regulation precisely deﬁnes the role and responsibilities of each partner, and requires contracts for all
operations relating to work on BSATs. The responsibility of the customer is clearly highlighted
Document management Document management will help to ensure the traceability of all transactions and secure storage of documentation
certifying implementation of biological safety and security measures. All of these documents must be available,
which requires the implementation of a speciﬁc system of document management
Speciﬁc requirements for the use of vertebrate
and invertebrate animals
(arthropods) in work on BSATs
For animal experiments, these requirements impose constraints that were previously not mandatory.
For example, vertebrate animals must have individual and permanent markings to ensure traceability of animals.
For small laboratory rodents (mice and rats), the implementation of individual identiﬁcation is complex,
and signiﬁcant additional costs are to be expected, depending on the technique used (tattoo, banding, microchip).
For the handling of BSAT-infected arthropods, many additional precautions must also be taken. For example,
regulations require systematic and rigorous counting of all individuals before and after manipulation, with all
of the extra work that this imposes
Emergency plan and areas of restricted access The laboratory will be required to set up an internal emergency plan for dealing with situations that may
endanger its staff, the public, or the environment. It should also provide periodic simulation exercises.
In developing this plan, the laboratory must work together with external services
(prefecture, ﬁreﬁghters, police, etc.). Finally, security measures will also be needed to reduce the
risk of BSATs being used for malicious purposes
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deadline for a decision was postponed until 2011, because no
consensus could be reached among the executive board of the
WHO. The debate on whether or not the remaining stocks of
smallpox virus should be destroyed is ongoing, and, in 2011,
the WHA decided to postpone this debate until the 67th
WHA in 2014, while limiting new research using the smallpox
virus (allowing studies started before now to ﬁnish) [32–34].
However, we must keep in mind that the most serious
concern related to smallpox is its conservation in laboratories.
Indeed, the virus is ringfenced in the USA and Russia, although
some stocks resulting from from mass production of the virus
include virulent forms and vaccination-resistant forms [35].
This is very worrying, as the two countries that possess stocks
of smallpox virus are those in which the two anthrax releases
occurred! Moreover, there are c. 50 genomes of human
poxviruses and dozens of genomes of animal poxviruses
available on the web (http://www.poxvirus.org). New institu-
tional regulations forbid the sequencing of smallpox DNA
longer than 500 bp, i.e. >20% of the total genome size, to avoid
the reconstruction of the smallpox virus on the basis of its
available genomes (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/smallpox/
SummaryrecommendationsMay08.pdf, 2014). Because the
USA and Russia possess stocks of smallpox virus, they may
continue to quietly sequence smallpox strains, while other
laboratories encounter difﬁculties concerning the identiﬁcation
and sequencing of new strains. For example, our laboratory was
not authorized to sequence smallpox DNA from an ancient
variola virus detected in a 300-year-old Siberian mummy [36].
Effects on scientiﬁc production
Some laboratories have begun and will continue to withdraw
from these research areas, which will produce a gap in the
health network. In France, for example, as shown in Table 4
(http://ansm.sante.fr/var/ansm_site/storage/original/application/4c
74b962e250416cdb5c35dd8dfd46fb.pdf page 124), the number
of laboratories working on BSATs decreased by 54%, and the
TABLE 4. Number of laboratories working on biological
select agents and toxins and the number of authorization
holders in France between 2011 and 2012 (http://ansm.sante.
fr/var/ansm_site/storage/original/application/4c74b962e25041
6cdb5c35dd8dfd46fb.pdf page 124)
No. 2011 2012
Laboratories 266 122
Authorization holders 473 138
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FIG. 1. Published items collected from the Institute for Scientiﬁc Information Web of Knowledge (blue curve), and numbers of websites (found by a
Google search) containing the words ‘bioterrorism’ (red curve), ‘anthrax’ (green curve) and ‘smallpox’ (purple curve) in the world between 1995 and
2013.
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number of authorizations delivered decreased by 71%,
between 2011 and 2012. A bibliometric analysis of the
bioterrorism archival literature was conducted to determine
whether negative consequences could be discerned, in which
global research publications dealing with bioterrorism from
1995 to 2013 were retrieved from the Institute for Scientiﬁc
Information Web of Knowledge (the term ‘bioterrorism’ was
entered in the topic ﬁeld). As shown in Fig. 1, this global
analysis revealed that there was a publication peak following
the 2001 attack, which decreased gradually in subsequent
years.
A second global analysis was performed by searching the
Institute for Scientiﬁc Information Web of Knowledge for the
following bacterial BSATs: Yersinia pestis, F. tularensis, Rickettsia
rickettsii, Rickettsia prowazekii, B. anthracis, extensively
drug-resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and Brucella melitensis
(the name of the bacterium involved was entered in the topic
ﬁeld). No time-span was selected, but the previous 20 years
were displayed when possible. A citation report was created
to represent a cumulative analysis of all bacterial BSATs cited
for the above-mentioned items each year, both worldwide and
in France and the URMITE laboratory (Fig. 2). Regarding the
previous ‘bioterrorism’ search, a decrease in scientiﬁc publi-
cations was observed in 2013 as compared with other years.
This reduction in publications was even more pronounced in
France and the URMITE laboratory following the French
implementation of two new laws addressing biosafety and
biosecurity and BSATs (the ﬁrst in 2010 and the second in
2013) [26,37].
This decrease in the number of scientiﬁc publications may
have been the result of scientists redirecting their research to
the study of attenuated strains that are not classiﬁed as BSATs
or to other research areas. Simultaneously, collaborations
between BSAT and non-BSAT laboratories may have been
affected, especially overseas. Indeed, the development of
diagnostics and vaccines may require the sharing of samples,
recombinant DNA, or toxins, although research partners may
be discouraged by the extensive and restrictive regulations.
The consequence of these restrictions is the slowing down of
research on organisms that pose a risk to humankind,
irrespective of their potential to be utilized for bioweapon
engineering.
Conclusion
This review summarizes and documents the impacts of the
increase in regulations concerning biosecurity, safety consid-
erations, and research and personnel limitations for biosafety
level 3 and 4 laboratories. Following the 11 September attacks
in 2001, biosafety laboratories have evolved, and the regula-
tions now demand higher stringency levels. Among many
reports on biosafety, only a few have presented data regarding
the evaluation and effectiveness of such restrictions; more-
over, no criteria for judging their effectiveness have been
reported. The BSAT regulations attempt to balance the need
for regulating access to the most dangerous pathogens and
minimizing regulatory burdens on basic biological research.
However, if BSAT regulations are too tough, they may diminish
long-term safety.
In recent years, the public has become increasingly
concerned with the threat of bioterrorism. Indeed, the threat
of bioterrorism has been greatly exaggerated by the media, and
the perceived threat is now far greater than the actual threat.
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Since the 11 September attacks, there has been an unparalleled
demand for information on bioterrorism. For example, a
Google search for web pages containing the word ‘bioterror-
ism’ yielded 6200 hits for 2000, 12 900 hits for 2001, and 8100
hits for 2013, regardless of any new, known bioterrorism
events (Fig. 1). Moreover, the results were similar when the
same search was performed with the term ‘smallpox’ or
‘anthrax’. The handling of complex pathogens by isolated
laboratory groups can hardly be considered in the context of
bioterrorism; in this regard, most agents proposed to be
potentially dangerous are not available technologically or
cannot be used to create a signiﬁcant impact. Rather, it is only
at the state level that a number of pathogens could be
militarized (as previously reported for Russia, for example).
Apart from the anthrax cases observed in 2001, no successful
example of the use of bacterial or viral agents has been
observed. However, it has become very difﬁcult to study
plague and tularaemia—diseases that actually kill people—as a
result of our erroneous, counterproductive response to the
imagined or real threat of bioterrorism. In fact, the greatest
success of bioterrorism activities could be seen as the
clampdown on well-intended and important biomedical
research. In this respect, the social consequences of bioter-
rorism in the ﬁeld of science (with tangible repercussions for
public health) have been spectacular.
We must therefore keep in mind that safety cannot be
expressed in absolute terms, but rather represents a relative
concept of tolerability and the limits of acceptability. Workers
and regulators must try to ﬁnd a balance between the costs of
safety measures and the potential beneﬁts for society and
human health. Specialized governmental and institutional
support is critical for researchers engaged in such highly
regulated programmes for the discovery of new antivirals,
therapeutics, vaccines and diagnostics for both biodefence and
emerging pathogens.
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